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Abstract
This paper analyzes, within a regional growth model, the impact of pro-
ductive governmental policy and integration on the spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity. Integration is understood as enhancing territorial cooperation
between the regions, and it describes the extent to which one region may
beneﬁt from the other region’s public input, e.g. the extent to which regional
road networks are connected. Both integration and the characteristics of the
public input crucially affect whether agglomeration arises and if so to which
extent economic activity is concentrated: As a consequence of enhanced inte-
gration, agglomeration is less likely to arise and concentration will be lower.
Relative congestion reinforces agglomeration, thereby increasing equilibrium
concentration. Due to the congestion externalities, the market outcome ends
up in suboptimally high concentration.
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Supporting convergence and intensifying European territorial cooperation are a-
mong the key objectives of European regional policy for the period of 2007-2013.
One of the instruments to reach these goals is the further improvement of the
transport infrastructure which is funded from structural and cohesion funds. Con-
sidering whether such an instrument is apt to reach the goal of convergence is
part of both theoretical and empirical analysis. Aschauer (1989) provided a semi-
nal work in which he derives a strong positive relationship between infrastructure
and growth. This could basically speed up convergence. However, more recent
contributions in the macroeconomic literature ﬁnd more modest returns to infras-
tructure investment (see e. g. Gramlich (1994) for an overview). Within endoge-
nous growth theory, those models strongly inﬂuenced by Barro (1990) analyze
ﬁscal policies if a productive governmental input serves as a growth determinant.
These models have been continuously reﬁned to allow for different characteristics,
especially congestion, of the public input (see e. g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1994a,
1994b) or Turnovsky (2000) for an overview): However, all these considerations
focus on the view of a single country and, if they analyze convergence at all, they
view it as the process leading to an equilibrium growth path. Consequently it is
not possible to explain the distribution of economic activity across space as a mere
consequence of interacting regions.
This concern lies at the heart of models known as ’new economic geography’ (see
Krugman (1995)). These models single out imperfect competition, increasing re-
turns and transportation costs as fundamental resources shaping the economic
landscape, but few focus on governmental activity. An exception is the work of
Martin and Rogers (1995): They focus on the role of infrastructure as facilitating
transactions, i. e. the trade within and between countries. Consequently agglom-
eration is reinforced as result of governmental activity. Puga (2002) analyzes the
impact of regional policy expenditures on mitigating regional disparities and high-
lights that a undifferentiated consideration of infrastructure neglects that different
characteristics of infrastructure also operate differently. Consequently, a thorough
analysis of the impact of regional productive governmental policy also requires a
sophisticated modelling of the public input.
However, though all these new economic geography models include regional gov-
ernmental policies, they exclusively consider infrastructure in reference to reduced
1transportation costs; by contrast, the Barro type models assume a productive gov-
ernmental input but neglect regional interaction. The European Union primarily
regards infrastructure as production input that enhances the productivity of the
other local inputs. Consequently, viewing infrastructure as reducing to transporta-
tion costs is too narrow if one wishes to analyze whether the newly intended
European regional policy will be successful in reducing regional disparities.
These shortcomings of the existing literature are the starting point for this model:
We analyze the impact of regional policy on agglomeration. In doing so, regional
policy thereby includes the provision of infrastructure that basically may be inter-
preted in a broad sense as comprising any facility, good or institution provided by
the government that enhances the productivity of the other private inputs. This al-
lows for a consideration of physical infrastructure such as roads, airports, telecom-
munication networks, but also basic research and training networks of education
infrastructure. These different types formally may be represented by integrating
a congestion function adopted from Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) which includes
relative and absolute congestion as well as capital spillovers. We use this mod-
elling of the governmental input and implement it in a modiﬁed version of the
regional growth model of Bröcker (2003), who for his part focusses on learning-
by-doing and inter-regional knowledge diffusion.
Integration between the two regions is modelled as the extent to which one region
may beneﬁt from the other region’s public input. With this formulation we rely on
Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapter 6) and are broader than the usual approach
of the new economic geography which assumes that integration predominantly
reduces transport costs and thereby strengthens agglomeration. Our setting is in
line with the goal of the European regional policy mentioned before, namely of
enhancing European territorial cooperation. Integration may be also achieved, for
example, by increasing the ﬂow of ideas between regions as already argued by
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and others. We assume identical production tech-
nologies with constant returns to the private inputs for the two regions. Mobile la-
bor migrates between the regions while capital accumulation is taking place in the
region with the higher productivity. The resulting equilibrium is based on equal-
ized productivities of mobile labor and capital, and it determines the equilibrium
capital distribution. Depending upon the interaction between agglomeration and
dispersion forces, multiple equilibria with different stability characteristics may
arise. It is shown that the bifurcation point is a function of congestion, capital
2spillovers and integration. The endowment with immobile labor acts as threshold
value that determines which equilibrium capital distribution ﬁnally results. Ag-
glomerations reﬂect equilibrium capital distributions with different regional capi-
tal stocks. In analogy to Krugman (1991), the region displaying the bigger capital
stock may then be interpreted as being the core, while the other region is the
periphery.
In the light of this model, convergence in the sense of the European Union may be
interpreted as a reduction in concentration. Basically this may be derived by inte-
gration or by the type of the governmental input provided, i. e. the choice about
the degrees of congestion and spillovers. The following relationships become evi-
dent from numerical simulations: Integration reduces concentration since it allows
the periphery to access the core’s public input and hence to beneﬁt from its produc-
tivity. In contrast to this, relative congestion is associated with a negative capital
externality and aggravates concentration. As a consequence, the resulting market
equilibrium ends up in suboptimally high concentration. The impact of capital
spillovers may be ambiguous: Basically agglomeration forces are strengthened by
capital spillovers since the productivity advantage of the core gains importance.
Nevertheless, strong spillovers may smooth concentration if combined with a high
degree of relative congestion. This is the consequence of decreasing marginal
returns in the governmental input.
The remainder of the paper is a follows: After presenting the analytical framework
the in the next section, balanced steady states are derived in Section 3. Section 4
explores the determinants of agglomeration, while Section 5 carries out numerical
simulations. Efﬁciency arguments are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes,
while formal derivations are relegated to the appendix.
2 The analytical framework
2.1 Firms
Firms in both regions ı=0,1 produce the homogenous good,Yı, by the same Cobb-
Douglas technology. The inputs used in each region are mobile labor, Mı, immobile
labor, Lı, and private capital, Kı. Furthermore, output depends upon regional
access to a global public input that is measured by an index, Dı. The production





ı, l ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ a ≥ 0, 1 ≥ g ≥ 0 (1)
The global public input, Dı, includes the regional public inputs, Gsı, that are sep-
arately provided by both regions. The ﬁrm’s access to the other region’s public
input may be limited as parameterized by 0 < b < 1, and we assume
D1 = Gs1+bGs2 (2a)
D2 = Gs2+bGs1 (2b)
Correspondingly, the parameter b may be interpreted as a measure for the extent
of integration between the two regions: If b = 0, ﬁrms in each region only beneﬁt
from the public input provided by their local governments, and consequently the
scope of governmental policy is restricted to their own region. In contrast to
this, b > 0 implies that ﬁrms in one region also have (at least partial) access to
the other region’s public input. What we have in mind is the following: If the
government of a certain region provides education for the early childhood, with
the goal to increase the productivity in its own region, the impact on the other
region’s productivity probably will not be affected signiﬁcantly (at least if labor
is immobile). Formally, b will be close to zero. The same argument applies to
the provision of a university that restricts the access to students stemming from its
own region. If, in contrast to this, the government of region 1 provides universities
which are open to students from region 2 (and if graduates return to their home
region), productivity in both regions will increase as consequence of governmental
activity in one single region. Then, b will be positive. Another example could also
be given by the provision of a public infrastructure. Consider two countries that
both provide a road network as public input. As long as these networks are not
connected, the spatial scope of governmental policy is restricted to its own region.
Firms in region ı only beneﬁt from their own region’s roads, b=0. But if now, e.g.,
ferries, connecting roads, tunnels or bridges are established, the road network in
region 1 may be also used by ﬁrms of region 2. Formally, b increases up to b = 1;
this reﬂects the other polar case in which ﬁrms in both regions have access to the
entire public inputs provided in both regions. Then the global public input covers
both road networks, Dı = Gs1+Gs2, and the two regions are perfectly integrated.1
1Note that both limiting cases, b = 0 and b = 1, characterize an extreme and unrealistic world
but may be well useful as benchmark cases.
4Another example can be given by the validity area of patents that describe another
facet of the spatial scope of governmental activity.
The modelling of the governmental input is adopted from Eicher and Turnovsky








ı , 0 ≤ eR ≤ 1, −a ≤ eA ≤ 1 (3)
Thereby ¯ Kı denotes the aggregate stock of private capital in region ı, and Gı de-
notes the aggregate ﬂow of government expenditure. Function (3) incorporates
the potential for the public good to be associated with alternative types and de-
grees of scale effects or congestion as denoted by eA and eR. In contrast to Eicher
and Turnovsky (2000), we do not restrict the sign of eA to be negative, but we
allow for positive and negative externalities at the aggregate level.2 Nevertheless,
in order to allow for ongoing growth, −a ≤ eA has to be satisﬁed, as will be ex-
plained below. Altogether, the public services can be classiﬁed into the following
categories.
(i) If eA = eR = 0, government services constitute a pure public good in the sense
of Samuelson (1954) and Gsı = Gı. The public input is available equally to each
individual within region ı, independent of the usage of others.3 Governmentally
provided basic research may serve as an example. Its usage by one ﬁrm does not
affect the possible usages of the others. The same is true for the usage of the public
input by ﬁrms from other regions.
(ii) Relative congestion arises if eR > 0: This reﬂects situations in which the level
of the public input available to the individual is tied to this individual’s usage of
capital. As already explained, eR = 0 corresponds to a nonrival pure public input,
while eR = 1 reﬂects a situation of proportional relative congestion. Accordingly,
the cases 0 < eR < 1 correspond to situations of partial relative congestion, in the
sense that given the individual stock of capital, government spendings can increase
at slower rate than does ¯ Kı and still provide a ﬁxed level of services to the ﬁrm.
An example for eR ≤ 1 could be the provision of a road network. In extreme, it
2Note that the integration parameter b is also a measure for the extent to which the arising
externalities of one region have a bearing on the other region. Above, the actual level of eA is of
major importance for the resulting equilibria.
3Since only few examples of such pure public goods exist, this case should be treated primarily
as a benchmark.
5is proportionally congested and each of the Nı individuals within region ı may
use 1/Nı parts of the entire public input, Gı, for production.4 Relative congestion
reﬂects the disadvantages of concentration: For a given amount of governmental
input (e. g. infrastructure), the individually available amount is smaller, the more
individuals make use of it or – put differently – the larger the aggregate capital
stock. A single-lane highway is more productive for the individual ﬁrm, the less
other trucks (aggregate capital) use it.
(iii) Intra-regional spillovers given that eA > −1: In any dynamic equilibrium, ag-
gregate capital and governmental expenditures grow at the same constant rate,
as will be demonstrated in the context of (19). Hence, with eA > −1, positive
effects of capital accumulation arise, and individuals beneﬁt from the accumula-
tion of the others. This externality can be interpreted as a net externality or in
the sense of Romer (1986); and an example could be the outcomes of research
centers that are ﬁnanced by non-distortionary taxes.5 The positive effects of the
governmental input increase with the absolute size of the economy: Learning by
doing is promoted by governmentally provided schools and universities; and the
productivity increase induced by schools and universities is enhanced by a high
degree of automation displayed by high capital intensity.
For the production technology (1) to allow for endogenous growth in both regions,
an additional constraint has to be imposed, namely a+g(1+eA) = 1. This ensures
constant returns to private capital, the accumulable factor.6
From (1), (2) and (3), the output of the individual (representative) ﬁrm in re-
4As Turnovsky (1996, p. 364) argues, the case eR > 1 describes a situation where congestion is
so great that the public input must grow faster than the economy in order for the level of services
provided to the individual ﬁrm to remain constant. This case is unlikely at the aggregate level,
but may well be plausible for local public goods (see also Edwards (1990)). A local public good
could be a harbor that is provided by the regional government. Nevertheless it also may be used
by individuals coming from outside the region. However, Turnovsky (1996) argues in the context
of a one-country model; hence it is not possible to apply the argumentation carried out there 1:1
to our framework. Here, possible utilization of an input that is provided by the other region is
parameterized by b > 0 and not by eR > 1.
5Note that the positive spillovers in the model of Romer (1986) do not exactly correspond to
the framework of this model since there the spillovers arise independent of governmental activity.
6This interdependence between the parameters implies an adjustment of the values of a or
g whenever a change in absolute congestion, eA, is analyzed. Besides, together with 0 < g ≤ 1
another constraint, namely −a ≤ eA has to be imposed to enable ongoing growth. Otherwise
capital productivity would not sufﬁce to promote endogenous growth.














and output of the representative ﬁrm in region 2 may be derived accordingly. If
b = 0, the scale elasticity of Yı is given by l+µ+a+g(1+eA). Hence, for all
feasible levels of eA, production is characterized by increasing returns to the local
inputs and this is reinforced with increasing eA. The private (average) capital
































Thereby the following variables are utilized
g ≡ G1/G2, gs ≡ Gs1/Gs2 = gkeR¯ keA−eR with k ≡ K1/K2, ¯ k = ¯ K1/ ¯ K2 (6)
Average productivities thus depend on the distribution of capital and governmen-
tal activity across regions, as incorporated within gs, the ratio Gı/Kı, as well as on
the number of ﬁrms located in each region and on the type of the public input, as
incorporated within the term N
g(eA−eR)
ı .
2.2 Households and regional growth
Households are identical across regions and are comprised of either immobile or
mobile workers. Immobile workers receive wages denoted by w(t), while mobile
workers receive wages denoted by m(t). Mobile workers do not face any relocation
cost and choose the location offering the highest value of m(t). Since perfect
competition at the factor markets is assumed, wages for mobile labor are highest
where the private marginal productivity of mobile labor is highest.
The inﬁnitely lived households possess identical isoelastic preferences, and the










7As the households’ preferences are homothetic, we prefer to analyze the optimization problem
of the collectivity of the households in order to avoid too many indices.
7The subjective discount rate is denoted by r, and s is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Households save by accumulating a risk free asset. The asset value
equals the value of the stock of capital at any point in time and hence the asset
value of the two regions at time t equals V(t) ≡ q1(t)K1(t)+q2(t)K2(t), where qı
denotes the stock price of capital installed in region ı.
Mobile and immobile workers earn labor income as well as capital income from
investment in both regions. Their total income evolves according to
˙ Vw(t)+ ˙ Vm(t) = w(t)L(t)+m(t)M(t)+(r(t)−d)V(t)−C(t)−T(t) (8)
with r(t) denoting the interest rate determined in capital market equilibrium, d as
the constant depreciation rate of private capital and T(t) as constant lump-sum
tax that is used to ﬁnance the provision of the public input. To fully describe the
optimization problem, the transversality condition
lim
t−¥
Kı(t)xı(t) = 0 (9)
has to be met, where xı denotes the shadow value of capital. Maximizing (7)





Due to constant average returns of capital (see (5)), the consumption-wealth ratio
is constant and hence the growth rates of consumption and capital coincide.
3 Balanced steady states
The equilibrium is based on equalized productivities of mobile labor and private
capital. It thus includes the migration of Mı and the accumulation of Kı. In order to
keep the analysis simple, we assume that labor mobility neither induces mobility
costs nor requires time. In contrast, physical capital is only mobile as long as it
is not yet nailed down. Hence, the marginal return of mobile labor is equalized
across regions in each time increment, whereas the adjustment process of marginal
capital returns takes time.
8In what follows time indices will be suppressed.
8Labor market equilibrium A migration equilibrium requires that mobile labor is
distributed such that the wages of mobile workers, m(t), are equalized across re-
gions. As already mentioned above, perfect mobility of mobile workers is assumed.
Hence, the migration equilibrium is given when marginal productivities of Mı in













Perfect labor mobility thus implies that the output ratio equals the ratio of mobile










 g  1
1−µ
(12)
Lower case letters reﬂect the distribution of the respective variable across the two
regions as given by (6). In the context of (12), only the relative sizes of the
aggregate variables, and not their absolute levels gain importance. For given pro-
duction elasticities and given l, the distribution of mobile labor across the regions
only depends on the distribution of private capital, k, as well as on governmental
activity. The latter also includes the spatial scope via spillovers, eA, the congestion
parameter, eR, and the extent of inter-regional integration as measured by b.
Capital market equilibrium Individuals in the two regions are able to hold capital
either in region 1 or in region 2. Hence, not only mobile labor, Mı, but also capital
is mobile as long as it is not yet nailed down. Consequently, capital is immobile
once being installed and may not be relocated to the other region. Therefore net
investment in either region is nonnegative and given by
Iı = ˙ Kı−dKı ≥ 0 (13)
With qı denoting the stock price of capital installed in region ı, the following condi-
tions are complementary and must be fulﬁlled for sustained investment in region ı
Iı ≥ 0, qı ≤ 1, Iı(1−qı) = 0 (14)
No-arbitrage applies if capital in both regions yields identical rates of private re-
turn




9Since we abstract from adjustment costs, the marginal costs for installing an addi-
tional unit of capital in region ı is unity. Consequently marginal costs and marginal
returns of an additional unit of capital are equalized if qı =1, and as long as qı =1,
private investors are willing to invest in region ı.9 Then ˙ qı = 0; and according
to (15), the interest rate equals the net marginal product of capital, r =¶Yı/¶Kı−d
and investment is positive, Iı > 0. If instead qı < 1, no investment will take place.
Then Iı = 0. Since individuals only invest in the region with the higher capital
return, positive investment in both regions is only feasible if marginal capital pro-
ductivities coincide. Then both capital stocks grow at the same rate and the capital
ratio, k, is constant.








A balanced steady state is characterized by a stationary capital distribution, i. e. by
R = 1. Then ongoing positive investment in both regions arises and capital stocks
in both regions grow according to (10), with r being derived from (4). In case
of initial productivity disparities (i. e. R  = 1), the prevailing capital ratio is not
stationary; but over time transitions to a steady state with k increasing (if R > 1)
or decreasing (if R < 1) will take place. Hence an equilibrium is only attained
after a certain transition period, but k converges to a stable equilibrium in ﬁnite
time. Since we assumed that capital is immobile once it has been nailed down, a
transition with increasing k implies that during the transition period there is only
investment in region 1 and no investment in region 2. The capital stock in region 2
then declines with the depreciation rate, d.
Assume that initially capital in region 1 is more productive. Then the transition
may be described by the following differential equations
˙ K1 =Y1+Y2−dK1−C−(G1+G2) (17a)




















9If qı > 1, investment would be inﬁnite; hence to analyze balanced steady states and the corre-
sponding transitions, it is sufﬁcient to deal with qı = 1.
10which hold as long as q2 < 1. (17a) is the goods market equilibrium condition;
(17b) is due to exclusive investment in region 1; (17c) describes the Keynes-
Ramsey rule; and (17d) is the equilibrium condition of the asset market. Note
that in (17a) it is assumed that the provision of G1+G2 is realized out of global
income Y1+Y2.10
4 Determinants of agglomeration: core and periph-
ery
4.1 Equilibrium and government expenditure
To study the model’s dynamics, we focus on stable steady states, and on transitions
to stable steady states. Formally one has to analyze how productivities of private
capital in both regions depend on the regional distribution of capital as well as
on governmental activity, provided that mobile labor is distributed such that the
corresponding wages, m(t), are equalized across regions any time. To do so, the
ratio R may be derived from the speciﬁed production function (4), together with
(11) and (12). Note that since we focus on a growing economy, we assume that
the governments in both regions set the aggregate expenditure levels, Gı, as a
constant fraction, qı, of aggregate capital, ¯ Kı, namely11
Gı = qı ¯ Kı, 0 < qı < 1 (18)
An expansion in government expenditure is then parameterized by an increase in
the capital share, qı. Additionally we have to take into account that in equilibrium
¯ Kı = NıKı applies. Then
˜ gs = qk1+eAn1+eA−eR (19)
deﬁnes the equilibrium ratio of governmental activity, and q ≡ q1/q2. In equilib-















10The regional decision about the governmental input is described in Section 6.
11The derived results are equivalent to assuming Gı = qYı but the formulation in (18) keeps the
formal analysis much simpler.
11Taking logarithms, after some simple manipulations, yields













Referring to the equilibrium concept, balanced steady states are attained at those
capital ratios, k∗, that solve i(k∗) = −llnl. Then R = 1 and the marginal capital
productivities are equalized across the regions. Since both regions then grow at
constant rates, the capital ratio stays constant.12 The initial endowment with
immobile labor, −llnl, reﬂects a threshold value that does not only affect the
equilibrium capital ratio, but may also have a major impact on the number of the
ﬁnally resulting equilibria. The threshold value is independent of the capital ratio,
k, and decreases in l and l. In case of symmetric distribution of immobile labor,
l = 1, the term vanishes and R ≷ 1 if i(k) ≷ 0. The intuition for this is that, all
things being equal, an increase in l increases the relative productivity in region 1.
Hence, the relative capital productivity stemming from the other inputs included
in i(k) has to be lower in equilibrium in order to balance capital productivity in
both regions (R = 1).
Depending on the characteristics of i(k) it is possible to attain either one unique
equilibrium or multiple equilibria, the latter showing different stability charac-
teristics.13 Stable equilibria arise whenever capital ratios outside the equilibrium
strive towards the equilibrium. If, in contrast, the capital ratio continuously de-
parts from the equilibrium, the underlying equilibrium is unstable.
Within Figures 1(a) and 1(b) the equilibrium capital ratios are denoted by k∗
and k∗∗ respectively and the stability implications are indicated by the arrows at
the horizontal axis. The threshold value is denoted by i∗. The intuition for multiple
equilibria will be discussed below.
Formally, the underlying equilibrium is unstable whenever function i(k) is posi-
tively sloped in the equilibrium capital (see k∗∗ in Figure 1(b)). If then, starting
from the steady state capital ratio, the relative capital productivity in region 1 in-
creases (R > 1), the resulting capital productivity advantage in region 1 attracts
12Note that it is anyhow possible that, given identical growth rates, both regions diverge with
respect to their absolute levels of output, governmental input and private capital.












(b) i′(k) ≷ 0: multiple equilibria
Figure 1: Stability and multiple equilibria
investment and induces further increases of k. Hence the capital distribution de-
parts continuously from the initial steady state and the system diverges from the
unstable equilibrium. The argumentation holds analogously if, starting from an
initially unstable equilibrium, k∗∗, the capital ratio is reduced and then declines
continuously. If on the contrary the function i(k) is negatively sloped for equilib-
rium capital ratios (see k∗ in Figures 1(a) and 1(b)), an increase in k reduces the
ratio of capital productivities (R < 1), thus giving rise to a productivity advantage
in region 2. Then k declines and converges again to its original steady state value.
It is possible to show that within our framework either one stable equilibrium or
three equilibria result – the latter exhibiting stability characteristics as indicated
within Figure 1(b) and argued above.14 A more unequal distribution of immobile
labor induces a shift of the threshold value away from the k-axis. Hence if the
regions sufﬁciently differ with respect to their endowment of immobile factors,
multiple equilibria will not occur even if the run of i(k) would basically allow for
multiple equilibria. Instead there is one stable equilibrium and the equilibrium
capital ratio reﬂects the distribution of immobile labor, with k∗ increasing in l.
The simple reason is that capital and labor are complementary production fac-
tors; hence a large amount of immobile labor causes a productivity advantage for
physical capital.
4.2 Agglomeration and concentration
To analyze the regional distribution of economic activity, we now focus on stable
equilibria with k∗  = 1; hence we consider the case of multiple equilibria. In this
context, stable equilibria will be called agglomerations, with a concentration of
mobile factors. We consider transitions in which concentration is either increased
14See Appendix A for a proof.
13or reduced. Following Krugman (1991), the region which holds the higher capital
stock then represents the core of the entire economy, whereas the other region is
the periphery. The analysis will be carried out for equally distributed immobile
labor, l = 1; hence the threshold value is given by −llnl = 0. The argumentation
focusses on those determinants that affect the run of function i(k) and the under-
lying economic effects will be discussed. Two aspects gain especial importance:
the sign of i′(k), which determines whether agglomeration forces (i′(k)>0) or dis-
persion forces (i′(k) < 0) prevail; and the multiplier that decides on the extent of
the arising forces.
Starting point is i(k) in (22). We then analyze the impact of capital productivity
differentials on the development of the capital ratio, k. If this ratio increases, eco-
nomic activity becomes more concentrated over time. The formal analysis yields



























[a(˜ gs+b)+geR ˜ gs][a(1+b˜ gs)+geR]
(23c)
Eq. (23a) displays the direct effect of an increase in the capital ratio on the relative
capital productivity. Due to constant returns of the private inputs, µ+a<1; hence
there are decreasing local returns to mobile labor, Mı, and private capital, Kı, as
long as the productivity impact of capital within Dı is neglected. Since a<1, a rise
in capital endowment goes along with a decreasing marginal product of capital.
If, analogously we focus on the ratio of capital stocks, an unequal distribution of
physical capital (large k) ceteris paribus leads to lower capital return in the core,
R < 1. Hence, investment is more attractive in the periphery, and this results in
a decrease of k. The direct effect (23a) contributes to the convergence of the
system to equally distributed physical capital, k = 1, and tends to cut off nascent
concentration.
In addition to this direct effect, there is an indirect effect of an increase in relative
capital, k, on i(k), which is included within the terms (23b) and (23c). They
14capture the impact of governmental activity, as incorporated within ˜ gs, and also
consider the impact of integration, b. Starting from an initial equilibrium capital
ratio, any increase in k will raise the relative supply of the public inputs, ˜ gs (see
(19)). This leads to counterworking effects on the relative productivity of capital.
Negative effects result from the decreasing marginal productivity of the public
input. Positive effects are due to the complementarity of physical capital and the
public input in the production function, YıKıGsı > 0.
For all feasible parameter constellations and provided that b<1, the term (23b) is
positive (negative) if µ+g>1 (µ+g<1). If g is sufﬁciently low, this term reinforces
dispersion due to decreasing marginal productivity of governmental expenditures.
More unequally distributed capital (higher k) unambiguously increases the ratio
between individually available public inputs, ˜ gs. Due to decreasing marginal pro-
ductivity of the public input, the ratio of capital productivity tends to decrease.
Contrariwise, capital and the public input are complementary production factors.
If g is sufﬁciently high, this argument prevails and the term (23b) strengthens the
agglomeration forces.
The third term (23c) is positive since µ<1 and eA >−1, which both reﬂect sensible
parameter constellations. Hence according to (23c) concentration unequivocally
increases. As a consequence, the relative productivity of physical capital continues
to rise thus inducing further increases and fostering concentration. The strength
of this effect is reinforced if eR is increased.
The total effect combines the partial effects. To sum up the implications of (23)
one ﬁnds forces that foster and those that relax the concentration of economic ac-
tivity. The entire effect is crucially inﬂuenced by the extent of regional integration,
as parameterized by the term b: The second as well as the third term ((23b) and
(23c)) decrease with rising b; the second term vanishes if b = 1. Hence the arising
forces are the stronger, the less pronounced the regional interdependencies are.
The reason therefore is that in more isolated regions (low b), the own region’s
public input gains relatively more importance for the ﬁrm’s behavior. If, instead,
there is a close relationship between the regions (high b), the relative impact of
one’s region governmental policy is weaker, but also the amount of governmental
input provided by the other region affects the ﬁrm’s decisions.
154.3 Multiple equilibria and bifurcations
In the following we derive in more detail the formal conditions that are required
for the origination of multiple equilibria. One central argument will concern the
derivation of the bifurcation point that separates conditions in which one unique
equilibrium arises from those that go along with multiple equilibria. Due to the
multitude of inﬂuencing factors, it is basically possible to describe the bifurcation
point as a function of several variables.15 Since the paper focusses on the impact
of regional governmental policies, we derive the bifurcation point as a function
that covers all policy parameters, namely eA,eR and b.
Starting points of the considerations are eqs. (22) and (23), and we assume that
immobile labor is equally distributed, l = 1. From Figure 1(b), we now that i(k)
is negatively sloped in the limits k = 0 and k → ¥. Moreover, the function i(k) has
an unambiguous root at k = 1.16 Therefore, the incidence of multiple equilibria
depends on the slope of i(k) in the root at k = 1: If the slope is negative, one
unique and stable equilibrium arises, whereas multiple equilibria exist if the slope
of i(k∗ = 1) is positive.
It is straightforward to show that the slope of function i(k) is unambiguously neg-
ative for sufﬁciently low extents of intra-regional spillovers, eA → −1. This case
applies if the public input is characterized by congestion and the available amount
of the public input decreases with the size of the economy as given by Gsı =qıN−eR
ı .
Hence, dispersion strictly dominates for any capital distribution, k, as given by
di(k)
dk






With an increase in intra-regional spillovers, eA, concentration forces arise due to
productivity advantages and scale effects.17 A rise in eA implies an increase in the
individually available amount of the public input, hence we have a positive effect
of the aggregate capital stock on private capital returns. Moreover, scale effects
come into play as the absolute size of aggregate capital affects the individually
available amount of public input. A region with a relatively high aggregate capital
stock, ¯ Kı, offers a higher amount of the public input, Gı = qı ¯ Kı. This results in
more individually available public input and therefore in enhanced productivity.
15See (28) below.
16See the mathematical Appendix A for a proof.
17The slope i′(1) increases in eA as derived in Appendix A.
16Comparing two regions which differ in their capital endowment, this fosters the
concentration forces.
For increasing intra-regional spillovers, eA, the agglomeration forces may domi-
nate in the neighborhood of k = 1, as will be shown in the following. Provided
that symmetry is given (q = n = 1), the slope of i(k) in k = 1 is given by
di(k)
dk
       
k=1








      
force2
(25)
Agglomerations arise if agglomeration forces dominate around k = 1 and hence
if neither agglomeration forces nor dispersion forces unequivocally prevail for all
capital ratios. In general, multiple equilibria arise if










       
k=1
≷ 0 ⇐⇒ eA ≷ ¯ eA(b,eR) (27)




and ¯ eA denotes the bifurcation point.18 This threshold value separates the cases
in which one unique and stable equilibrium (provided that eA < ¯ eA) or multiple
equilibria (in case of eA > ¯ eA) arise. Its level is crucially affected by the (exoge-
nously given) parameters eR and b, which both are determined by governmental
decisions. Arguing from an analytical point of view, an increase in eA rotates the
graph of i(k) with center at k = 1. Beginning with a sufﬁciently low level eA, dis-
persion forces dominate for all capital ratios, k, and i(k) is shaped as illustrated
within Figure 1(a). If now eA increases until it exceeds the value of the bifurca-
tion point as given by (28), the dynamic behavior switches toward a scenario with
18To derive equation (28), note that a+g(1+eA) = 1, hence g = (1−a)/(1+eA); and then solve
equation (26) for eA. Note that to ensure the knife-edge condition of endogenous growth, the
productivity of government expenditures, g, has to be reduced whenever an increase in spillovers,
eA, is considered. In order to prevent the preponderance of this to some extent artiﬁcial argument,
we restrict to parameter settings which result in a positive denominator of ¯ eA. In contrast to
the presentation within (28), one could basically also denote the bifurcation point as ¯ b(eA,e) or
¯ eR(b,eA). Qualitatively the results would not change. We calculate different bifurcation points
according to (28) in the context of the numerical presentations within Section 5.
17agglomeration. The intuition for this is that increasing intra-regional spillovers
(eA ↑) increase local returns, thus strengthening agglomeration forces.19 Then, the
agglomeration forces dominate around k = 1, and ﬁnally the derivative di(k)/dk
becomes positive; multiple equilibria arise. Nevertheless, if capital is distributed
more unequally across regions, the dispersion forces eventually dominate and en-
sure that two stable equilibria exist. Hence, agglomeration arises if (and only if)




(a) low relative congestion
k∗ k∗
¯ eA eA
(b) high relative congestion
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagram.
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of two bifurcation diagrams. For sufﬁ-
ciently small eA the dispersion forces generally dominate and a unique equilibrium
ratio k∗ results. As soon as eA exceeds the threshold value ¯ eA in (28), the dynamics
crucially change and multiple equilibria arise.
Basically, the sign of ¯ eA within (28) can either be positive or negative, depending
predominantly on the integration parameter and on the degree of relative conges-
tion. An increase in territorial cooperation (increase in b) leads to an increase in





(−a(1+b)(2b(1−a)−µ(1+b))+eR(1−a)2b(1−µ))2 > 0 (29)
Intra-regional spillovers, eA, have to be stronger to induce agglomeration if there
is more integration. Due to the increased cooperation between the regions, the pe-
riphery can beneﬁt from the spillovers arising in the core; hence the agglomeration
forces are weakened.





(−a(1+b)(2b(1−a)−µ(1+b))+eR(1−a)2b(1−µ))2 < 0 (30)
19This argument will be discussed in the context of Figures 3.
18and displays the overestimation of physical capital return due to the congestion
externality. Individuals do not take their impact on aggregate capital into account.
When they decide about capital accumulation, they take aggregate capital as given
and independent from their own decision. Therefore, equilibrium capital accumu-
lation is suboptimally high and reinforces the agglomeration forces. Hence, the
level of intra-regional spillovers which is necessary to induce agglomeration de-
creases.
Nevertheless, integration and congestion do not only inﬂuence the bifurcation
point, ¯ eA, but additionally impact on the resulting concentration. Increases in
eA may lead either to a higher or to lower concentration within the equilibrium
agglomerations, depending on the degree of relative congestion, eR, and on inte-
gration, b. Numerical simulations within the next section will help to enlighten
these complex interdependencies.
5 Numerical simulations
As argued before, agglomeration only occurs if regional spillovers are sufﬁciently
high, or to argue more precisely, if eA > ¯ eA(b,eR) as represented by the bifurcation
point within (28). Nevertheless, higher values of eA do not automatically result
in more concentration. The following calculations and simulations illustrate the
sensitivity of the model with respect to those parameters that represent the exter-
nalities, eA and eR, as well as integration, b. We show their impact on the number
of equilibria in the context of Table 1 and analyze their impact on concentration
within Figures 3 and 4.
Table 1: Bifurcation points ¯ eA(b,eR)
eR = 0.2 eR = 0.23 eR = 0.35
b = 0.2 -0.7 -0.722 -0.761
b = 0.25 -0.104 -0.280 -0.502
b = 0.3 1.780 0.557 -0.224
Tables 1 and 2 show values of the bifurcation points by solving (25) for eA and
assuming a = 0.25 and µ = 0.2. They illustrate how the levels of the bifurcation
19points are affected by integration and relative congestion. The gray values in
Table 1 refer to the bifurcation points indicated in Figure 3, while the gray values
in Table 2 correspond to Figure 4.
The tables could be interpreted as follows: Increasing integration unequivocally
raises the value of the bifurcation point and thus supports the hypothesis that
integration mitigates agglomeration forces. The contrary applies with respect to
eR: There the level of the bifurcation point is reduced with increased congestion,
and agglomeration becomes more likely.
Table 2: Bifurcation points ¯ eA(b,eR)
eR = 0.4 eR = 0.5 eR = 0.6
b = 0.5 0.895 0.286 0.056
b = 0.6 2.107 0.699 0.305
b = 0.7 5.219 1.252 0.580
Within the graphical simulations in Figures 3 and 4, we analyze how eA, eR and
b impact on concentration as measured by the equilibrium level of k∗. As far as
possible, we assume symmetry, q = n = l = 1. Hence the threshold value i∗(k) = 0
is represented by the horizontal axis. We consider constant returns to scale in the
private inputs (a+l+µ = 1) and make sure that the condition of endogenous
growth is fulﬁlled (a+g(1+eA) = 1). Under these conditions (at least) one equi-
librium with equal distribution of capital, i. e. k∗ =1, results and no agglomeration
takes place within it. If, instead, multiple equilibria arise, the region displaying the
higher capital stock represents the core, whereas the other region may be inter-
preted as being the periphery. The equilibria are symmetric in the sense that one
could easily change the region’s indices and would have the same implications as
before, but now from the point of view of the other region. Higher equilibrium
values of k∗ are interpreted as reﬂecting more concentration.
Figures 3(a)–3(c) plot the equilibrium capital distributions for alternative degrees
of integration and assume intermediate relative congestion, eR = 0.5. The levels
of the bifurcation points, ¯ eA, are indicated next to the respective degrees of inte-
gration. Solid lines represent high regional spillovers (eA = 0.9), while the dashed
lines correspond to low levels (eA = −0.2).20 In case of eA = −0.2 < ¯ eA, the pre-
20Since the simulations assume a = 0.25, we choose this lower benchmark for eA to fulﬁl the










(a) b = 0.5 (⇒ ¯ eA = 0.286)











(b) b = 0.6 (⇒ ¯ eA = 0.699)










(c) b = 0.7 (⇒ ¯ eA = 1.251)
Figure 3: The impact of integration if eR = 0.5
parameters: a = 0.25, µ = 0.2, l = 0.55, q = 1, n = 1, l = 1 ⇒ i∗: horizontal axis
solid line: eA = 0.9, dashed line: eA = −0.2
vailing agglomeration forces are too low, capital is equally distributed across the
regions, and k∗ = 1. If, instead, eA = 0.9, agglomeration is basically possible (see
Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). But more integration reduces concentration (lower k∗)
since then the smaller region may also beneﬁt from the spillovers of the bigger re-
gion. Consequently, capital accumulation does not move to the core. Figure 3(c)
displays a situation in which dispersion forces dominate in either case and k∗ = 1.
As argued before, increasing integration reduces the agglomeration forces.










(a) eR = 0.2(⇒ ¯ eA = −0.104)










(b) eR = 0.23 (⇒ ¯ eA = −0.28)







(c) eR =0.35 (⇒ ¯ eA =−0.502)
Figure 4: The impact of relative congestion if b = 0.25
parameters: a = 0.25, µ = 0.2, l = 0.35, q = 1, n = 1, l = 1 ⇒ i∗: horizontal axis
solid line: eA = 0.9, dashed line: eA = −0.2
Figures 4(a) – 4(c) emphasize the model’s sensitivity and focus on alternative lev-
els of relative congestion for b = 0.25. Again the levels of the bifurcation points
are included in parenthesis below each ﬁgure. Solid and dashed lines reﬂect eA
in analogy to Figure 3, and equal distribution only arises if eA < ¯ eA. The dashed
function in Figure 4(a) is one example. All other combinations of b and eR lead to
agglomeration, and the following structure may be observed: Increasing relative
condition −a < eA.
21congestion fosters agglomeration in either case. But note that concentration is
even more pronounced for low levels of eA. With this, the simulations also con-
ﬁrm the run of the bifurcation diagram within Figure 2(b). The intuition for this
result is as follows: On the one hand, we have intra-regional spillovers which fos-
ter concentration due to eA. But on the other hand, there are decreasing returns
not only in private capital but also in the governmental input as discussed in the
context of (23b). With an increase in spillovers, eA, the ratio of individually avail-
able governmental inputs, ˜ gs, increases; hence decreasing returns gain importance
and reduce concentration. However, as the simulations illustrate, the total effect
always implies agglomeration, not only for low but also for high values of relative
congestion. Since there is a negative capital externality which goes along with
congestion, individuals overestimate private capital return. Hence, agglomeration
may even become more concentrated due to an increase in congestion. Neverthe-
less, concentration is suboptimal as will be shown in the following section.
6 Efﬁciency
In order to judge the different agglomeration scenarios, it is necessary to compare
them with the social optimal situation: Which is the optimal degree of concentra-
tion? And is equilibrium concentration suboptimally high or low?
The efﬁcient solution internalizes capital externalities and optimizes government
expenditure rates. On the one hand, individuals neglect their inﬂuence on ag-
gregate capital; hence they overestimate the individually available amount of the
congested governmental input. There is a negative externality of capital accumu-
lation. On the other hand, regional governments usually neglect the productivity
impact of governmental activity on the other region. There is a positive externality
of governmental activity. We start with the consideration of the congestion exter-
nality. In order to evaluate the socially optimal degree of concentration, we have
to take into account that private investment increases aggregate capital and hence
reduces the individually available amount of the public input. If ﬁrms enlarge
their truck ﬂeet (private investment), the motorways become more crowded, and
there is less infrastructure applicable for each ﬁrm. Since all ﬁrms in region ı are





22The optimal capital distribution, k, is found by maximizing the income of the rep-
resentative individual Y =Y1+Y2 with respect to k. The representative individual’s
capital stock is given by K = K1+K2; hence physical capital in region 1 amounts






























  −1 ≷ 0 (33)
⇐⇒ i(k)+D(k) ≷ −llnl (34)






















D(k) reﬂects the capital externality and adjusts the ratio of private capital re-
turns to the socially relevant relation. D decreases in k and goes through zero
for symmetric capital distribution.21 Furthermore, D is bounded from above with
¯ D = ln(a+geR) and from below with −¯ D. Therefore, the dynamics of optimal
concentration are delivered according to Figure 5.
The fact that private investment increases aggregate capital and therefore reduces
the availability of the public input alters the ratio between the capital returns in
the two regions. Figure 5(b) shows that agglomeration is socially optimal. Never-
theless, concentration is suboptimally high. Since individuals overestimate private
capital returns, they react too sensitively with respect to a regional difference in
capital returns. As a consequence, the degree of concentration is suboptimally
high in market equilibrium.
The remaining point refers to optimal government expenditures: Public inputs
such as harbors are supra-regionally productive. If region 1 increases the provision










Figure 5: Equilibrium versus optimal dynamics.
of public inputs, the productivity in both regions rises. Within the optimal choice
of governmental expenditures, Gı, this impact has to be properly considered. The
optimal ratio q of regional public inputs is found by maximizing the representative
individual’s income Y =Y1+Y2 with respect to q and taking into account that G1 =
































Within the equilibrium analysis given in the last section, the ratio of governmental
activity, q, was assumed to be arbitrarily set. Nevertheless, a regional government
would decide about the amount of governmental activity, Gı, by equating marginal
costs and beneﬁts. As the homogenous good may be transformed 1:1 into govern-
mental expenditures, marginal costs of an increase in Gı are 1. Marginal beneﬁts
result from increased productivity. It is self-evident to assume that regional gov-
ernments are only concerned about the productivity in their own region. They dis-
regard the inter-regional impact of public inputs. Usually, a regional government
will only provide a harbor if the productivity gain in its own region is sufﬁciently
high to warrant the harbor. The regional government will not take into account
that, due to the harbor, other regions will experience increased productivity.
Hence, both regions equate the marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs of govern-
24mental activity according to
Y1G1
! = 1 and Y2G2





















Comparing the optimal ratio of governmental activity, q∗, and the corresponding
equilibrium value, ˜ q, in the symmetric case yields q∗ = ˜ q. The relative impact of the
positive diffusion externality is of the same magnitude in each region. Hence, the
ratio between governmental expenditures is unaffected. Nevertheless, the level of
governmental expenditures is suboptimally low.22 Applying this result to Figure 5
demonstrates that selﬁsh governmental behavior has no impact on the degree of
agglomeration compared to optimal governmental activity. Nevertheless, other
assumptions about regional governmental behavior could be analyzed, but this
will be done in another article since issues of political economy are not our main
concern here.
7 Conclusions
The basic objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of regional policy on the
spatial distribution of economic activity. We ask whether integration will increase
concentration as usually shown in new economic geography models which inter-
pret integration as a reduction in transport costs. And we ask whether the Euro-
pean regional policy to foster territorial cooperation will reach the goal to support
convergence. Within the context of the model presented, regional policy includes
the extent of inter-regional cooperation, as well as the type of the governmental
input provided. This input affects output not only directly but also indirectly as
it enhances the productivity of the other inputs. Since the governmental input is
characterized by absolute and by relative congestion, the model may be adopted to
a variety of interpretations; two examples are physical infrastructure or research
networks. It is shown that either one unique or multiple equilibria arise, with the
22This is easily seen since the direct marginal returns, YıGı, are lower than the social returns, FGı.
25latter showing different stability characteristics. Whether or not this leads to con-
vergence in the sense of the European Union’s regional policy goals depends upon
a variety of economic conditions.
The model is very sensitive to the assumed parameter constellations, but never-
theless some basic results are derived: Integration unequivocally reduces concen-
tration since it allows the smaller regions access to the other regions’ public input
and hence to beneﬁt from its productivity impact. This result stands in strong
contrast to those analysis that model infrastructure as facilitating trade. Rela-
tive congestion is associated with a negative capital externality and aggravates
concentration. As a consequence, the resulting market equilibrium ends up with
suboptimally high concentration. This argument reﬂects the typical discussion
within the growth literature about the impact of relative congestion. The effect
of intra-regional capital spillovers is more complex. Agglomeration only arises
if spillovers are strong enough to overweigh decreasing returns to private capi-
tal. Nevertheless, if a high level of capital spillovers applies in a situation of high
relative congestion, the impact may be reversed and decrease the resulting con-
centration.
The model’s policy implications could then be summarized as follows: More in-
tegration reduces regional disparities, while relative congestion operates in the
opposite direction. These congestion externalities could be internalized by a ﬁscal
policy that corrects for the distortions. With this, it is clear that much work is still
left to be done. Another open-ended question consists in the implementation of
governmental policy that merges the agglomeration effects of a regional govern-
mental policy that provides a productive input that also facilitates inter-regional
exchange.
Mathematical appendix
A Shape of i(k)
This ﬁrst part of the appendix is concerned with the derivation of the shape of
i(k). The thread is as follows: The limit of i for k = 0 is shown to be inﬁnity,
with an unambiguously negative slope. The limit of i for k → ¥ is −¥, and the
slope eventually approaches zero. Hence, i displays at least one root. One root is
26shown to be at k = 1. Hence, if the slope of i is positive for k = 1, we have two
agglomerations, one for k < 1 and one for k > 1; see Figure 1.
If k tends to zero, gs = qk1+eAn1+eA−eR tends to zero, too. Hence, the limit of i for
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For k going to inﬁnity, gs → ¥, and therefore
lim
k→¥
i(k) = (µ+a−1) lim
k→¥
ln(k)









































For a symmetric society, that is k = n = q = 1, and hence gs = 1, the function
unambiguously has a root
i(1) = 0 (44)
























B Shape of D(k)
In the following, we will analyze the slope of the function D(k) as given in (35),
which determines the discrepancy between equilibrium agglomeration and so-
cially optimal agglomeration. For notational convenience, we deﬁne D(k) ≡ (1−


































































It follows immediately that the slope of D is unambiguously negative.
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